Analyzing the "Hot" and "Lost" Rise of Anti-UAV Equipment

Recently, scenes of drone strikes against strategic bombers during regional armed conflicts captured global attention and shed new light on the use of drones.

Indeed, the various threats posed by drones on the battlefield have prompted countries to research effective countermeasures.

Against this backdrop, anti-UAV equipment has mushroomed and is highly sought after. However, in stark contrast, its combat effectiveness has rarely been discussed. This stark contrast between its "lack of interest" on the battlefield and its "hot" market has raised significant questions about the effectiveness of anti-UAV equipment.

In this issue, we examine this phenomenon and consider how we should view current anti-UAV equipment.

Why is it receiving a cold reception in actual combat?

For most countries, anti-UAV equipment is still relatively new, with limited technical maturity and deployment scale.

Taking the Russian military, which boasts extensive experience in counter-drone operations, as an example, its air defense systems with counter-drone capabilities and dedicated counter-drone systems account for less than 18% of its air defense system. The US military's counter-drone systems are mostly in the development or testing stages. Currently, militaries around the world are still equipped with traditional air defense systems primarily designed to defend against missiles and manned aircraft. Because the signal characteristics and flight patterns of these targets differ significantly from those of drones, they are less effective in counter-drone operations.

Data shows that many field air defense systems are generally used to intercept aerial targets such as helicopters and cruise missiles, with engagement altitudes typically between 300 and 6,000 meters. When it comes to intercepting drones, these systems struggle to achieve high-altitude targets and low-altitude targets.

For example, medium- and high-altitude reconnaissance and strike drones like the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and TB-2 typically cruise at altitudes above 6,000 or even 8,000 meters, making them simply beyond the reach of field air defense systems. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a few years ago, several SA-8 field air defense systems equipped by the Armenian army were unable to engage TB-2 medium- and high-altitude reconnaissance and strike drones due to insufficient range, and were repeatedly destroyed by them.

For another example, traditional air defense systems have limited detection capabilities against low, slow, and small targets. Small drones like quadcopters and drones typically fly below 150 meters, placing them in radar blind spots and difficult for field air defense systems to detect, making effective interception impossible. In 2019, two oil facilities in Saudi Arabia were attacked by drones, and the Patriot air defense systems deployed there failed to respond. US media have stated that even with top-tier US air defense systems, such facilities are not immune to attacks.

Historically, new weapons and equipment often experience a period of initial advantage that is difficult to overcome. This is similar to the way anti-aircraft guns faced jet fighters and battleships faced anti-ship missiles: they seemed helpless and powerless.

Therefore, the apparent incapacity of anti-drone equipment is not due to inherent weakness or drones being too powerful, but rather to the inevitable evolution of combat methods. To a certain extent, most current anti-drone operations remain an asymmetric contest between traditional air defense systems and drones, making a one-sided situation inevitable.

What are the current pain points?

Objectively speaking, traditional air defense systems are not invulnerable to all drones. At least judging from several recent local conflicts involving drones, those with relatively comprehensive air defense systems have a relatively high interception rate against large and medium-sized drones.

In February of this year, a US think tank released a report stating that the United States has been using the MQ-9 Reaper drone to monitor and strike targets in Yemen since 2002. For a long time, losses on this type of drone were minimal, with only three being shot down between 2017 and 2019. As the Houthi armed forces' air defense capabilities have improved, the MQ-9 Reaper's combat loss rate has skyrocketed. According to incomplete statistics, the Houthis have claimed to have shot down over 20 MQ-9 Reaper drones since 2023. The TB-2 drone, which rose to prominence during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has also been largely ineffective against Russian air defenses.

Currently, the focus of anti-drone operations is on combating small and micro drones. These drones are low-cost, simple in structure, have great potential for modification, and offer a high degree of operational flexibility, resulting in a wide range of combat options and strong battlefield adaptability. Relatively speaking, while the number of anti-drone equipment currently available in various countries is considerable, it falls short in terms of comprehensive functionality and reliability.

From a mainstream perspective, drone detection and identification primarily utilizes radio frequency analyzers, radars, visual/thermal imaging sensors, and acoustic sensors. Strike methods primarily include communication/navigation system jamming, signal hijacking, aerial interception, ground-based firepower strikes, the use of directed energy weapons, and net capture. Each of these methods has its own strengths and weaknesses.

Small and micro drones are quiet, have weak infrared radiation and radar reflection signals, and possess flexible and diverse control methods. Generally, only the integrated use of various sensing and detection methods can increase the probability of their detection and interception. Russian military experts revealed that during a 2020 Russian military test, an air defense missile battery consisting of four Pantsir-S1 combined missile and artillery systems fired at a slow-moving drone, but failed to destroy it despite multiple salvos. Even with four Pantsir-S1 combined missile and artillery systems, few anti-drone systems integrate multiple technologies to this level. Even those with a certain level of comprehensive capabilities often suffer from limited range or bulky, making them difficult to maneuver.

It's easy to see that the lack of a comprehensive anti-drone system is the root cause of the repeated failures in anti-drone operations. Currently, achieving multi-dimensional defense against drones is not a simple matter of simply stacking them together.

What are the current challenges?

The development of weapons and equipment follows the law of contradictory movement and requires dynamic and interconnected scrutiny. Addressing the threat posed by small and micro drones is the top priority and most crucial element in the development of anti-drone equipment. However, even if breakthroughs are made in countermeasures, we cannot expect to achieve complete success in one fell swoop. After all, technological and tactical innovations surrounding drones are also rapidly evolving. Examining the "magic" and "artificial" battle between drones and anti-drone equipment from a broader perspective and a dynamic development perspective, the greatest challenges facing the development of anti-drone equipment are capacity and cost.

On the one hand, the optimal response to drone saturation attacks, typified by "swarm warfare," has yet to be found, much like the nightmare of missile saturation attacks that remain a persistent problem for traditional air and missile defense systems. Military practice in the United States, Russia, and other countries demonstrates that controlling drones is easier than controlling the same number of missiles.

On the other hand, current anti-drone equipment and systems, whether used independently or in a coordinated "group" to counter drone swarms, are less than ideal. Reports indicate that the Russian-made Tunguska combined missile and artillery system struggles to meet the required reload speed when countering drone swarm attacks. When firing at a small drone at a distance of 3 kilometers, it requires at least two reloads to maintain a 50% hit rate. These circumstances suggest that alternative approaches are necessary to counter drone swarm attacks.

Given the advantages of directed energy, laser and microwave weapons may be helpful in addressing this issue. For example, the US military has deployed a laser weapon system on the USS Ponce, an amphibious ship, for counter-drone operations. The British Army has also successfully tested a high-energy laser weapon mounted on a Hound Dog armored vehicle, shooting down a mid-air drone with its laser. However, these laser and microwave counter-drone systems are largely in the experimental stage and present unresolved technical challenges, resulting in far less than satisfactory actual combat results.

Combined with the rapid development of artificial intelligence technology, another option may be the development of drones capable of countering drones. For example, the new interceptor drone, the Vogan-9SP, currently under development by Russia's Red Line company, employs a "drone-to-drone" approach. Equipped with a warhead weighing approximately 400 grams, it features a guidance system and computing unit, and maintains a "man-in-the-loop" mode. Based on radar detection and operator commands, the drone can fly toward its target at a speed of 200 kilometers per hour, simultaneously calculating the interception point and detonating the warhead upon approach.

On the other hand, with the widespread use of drones on the battlefield, the development of counter-drone equipment must address the issue of prohibitive costs. To minimize the phenomenon of "using a cannon to kill a mosquito," counter-drone tactics should explore not only "hard destruction" but also "soft strike" and "clever deception" tactics, such as electronic jamming, information blocking, and false alarms.

It is particularly noteworthy that in current local conflicts, the use of drones, particularly small and micro drones, continues to challenge conventional thinking, employ special warfare tactics, and overcome front-line constraints, achieving significant results at a relatively low cost. This also suggests that anti-drone operations are gradually moving beyond the scope of anti-drone equipment itself. Strengthening routine control of small and micro drones and full-time tracking and targeting of unidentified flying objects in the airspace near key locations will be essential.

What Makes It Truly Dependable?

In essence, anti-drone equipment is a branch of the air defense combat system. From the perspective of "comprehensive air defense," the current variety of anti-drone equipment and systems is merely a stopgap measure to address immediate threats. In the context of joint operations, future anti-drone equipment development must abandon the concept of independent operations. This is because only by adhering to the principle of "integration into the system and deployment on the platform" can the potential capabilities of anti-drone equipment be transformed into actual combat effectiveness to a greater extent.

First, integrated planning with air defense and anti-missile systems is essential. The advantage of such planning is that anti-drone equipment can share air situation information and target data, enabling more timely and effective drone detection. It can also enable targeted upgrades to air defense and anti-missile monitoring systems and weapon and ammunition performance based on its role within the multi-layered air defense framework, ensuring a dense air defense network and efficient interception. For example, Russia's "Dome Barrier" anti-drone system, currently under construction, will be integrated with the Russian and Turkish air defense systems, employing integrated reconnaissance and control measures within a "large air defense" system. This demonstrates this.

Second, decentralize anti-drone combat units. Strengthening grassroots anti-drone capabilities requires equipping them with appropriate anti-drone equipment. Given the increasing number of small and micro-drone raids, decentralizing lightweight anti-drone equipment to the grassroots is essential. This large number of anti-drone equipment can, to a certain extent, offset the advantage of swarms of drones and strive for full coverage of anti-drone capabilities. Currently, some countries are equipping combat teams with portable drone jammers, reflecting this trend.

Third, strengthen the deployment of main combat platforms. Adding anti-drone modules to high-value military assets vulnerable to drone attacks, particularly those deployed to main combat platforms, can effectively enhance their battlefield survivability. This is why the new generation of main battle tanks launched by the United States, Russia, and Europe are all equipped with drone countermeasure systems.

Through multiple measures, anti-UAV equipment may play a greater role on the battlefield in the future, and its current market popularity will have a more solid foundation and stronger thrust.